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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate in law around the moment that legal 
personhood comes into being within a legal order strongly 
impacts the enjoyment of reproductive and sexual rights of 
individuals in Latin America. In the courts, for example, this 
debate, has translated into limits on the exercise of 
emergency contraception by women or couples, and 
consequently defining the scope of sexual rights.1 Similarly, 
the debate has propelled civil society organizations, such as 
religious or conservative groups and human rights NGOs, to 
advocate for a specific determination of when legal 
personhood begins and what its effects should be on certain 
practices such as emergency contraception or assisted 
reproductive techniques.2 Furthermore, such debates have 
exposed the disagreements around regulation of this issue 
between state branches of power in different Latin American 
countries.3  
                                                
	  
	  
1 Martín Hevia, The Legal Status of Emergency Contraception in Latin 
America, 116 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 87 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Aníbal Faúndes, Luis Távara, Vivian Brache, & Frank Alvarez, 
Emergency Contraception under Attack in Latin America: Response of the 
Medical Establishment and Civil Society, 15(29) REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
MATTERS 130 (2007); Fernando Muñoz León, Morning After Decisions: 
Legal Mobilization Against Emergency Contraception in Chile, 21 MICH. J. OF 
GENDER & L. 123 (2014). 
3 E.g., Executive Order No. 27913-S [Costa Rica Executive] [Ministry of 
Health], 111 Gaztt. Jun. 9, 1999; Executive Order no. 24029-S [Costa Rica 
Executive] [Ministry of Health], 45 Gaztt. Mar. 3, 1995; Corte Suprema de 
la Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica] [Constitutional 
Chamber], Mar. 15, 2000, Sentencia 2000-02306, Exp. 95-001734-0007-CO 
(the executive orders and the Supreme Court judgment show the 
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A salient element of these debates is that all the parties, 
on either side of the ideological spectrum, have structured 
their claims around a global language that is, to a great 
extent, entrenched in contemporary polities: the language of 
(human) rights.4 The American States, with important 
exceptions, have entered into a transnational understanding 
comparable to a lingua franca of human rights adopted as 
the American Convention on Human Rights.5 Because all of 
the State Parties agree to abide and govern through this 
language of rights within the system, individuals from these 
American States have discovered an institutional opening 
for raising rights claims in the state or even international 
institutions.6 Notwithstanding this, the use of this language 
does not amount to a global language of understanding, but 
rather it offers individuals a vocabulary “to get in the door 
and then speak[] instrumentally or ethically.”7 
With a basis in this instrument, the language of rights 
applied to reproductive health has given place to different 
dialects framed on ontological or metaphysical perspectives, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
disagreement between the different branches on when legal personhood 
begins, and hence legal protections and effects on the legal regime of 
assisted human reproduction. In the case of Costa Rica, while the 
Executive regulated in vitro fertilization, the Supreme Court judged that 
the permissibility of this treatment violated the right to life of embryos.). 
4 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND RATIONALITY: ESSAYS ON REASON, 
GOD, AND MODERNITY 153-54 (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 1st ed. 2002).  
5 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention] (the important 
exceptions refer to Canada and the United States, stating that while both 
countries are part of the Organization of the American States, neither has 
ratified the American Convention). 
6 David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 103 (2002).  
7 Id.  
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which have, in turn, structured the debate on when life 
begins, generally, in absolute terms. For instance, human 
embryos have been described as full legal persons entitled to 
rights, and consequently, legislatures and courts have 
awarded them full protection of the law, disregarding 
women’s reproductive health rights or minority rights.8 
Conversely, (and simultaneously), these embryos have also 
been conceptualized, under such dialects, as mere organisms 
with potential legal claims and no recognized rights at all.9  
The disagreements around the articulation of these 
dialects, which are constructed on the basis of the language 
of human rights, depict a cultural or moral reading of the 
rights being championed or a moral reading evaluating what 
should not be considered valuable.10 In this sense, there are 
groups that advocate an absolute right to life under a 
metaphysical or teleological conceptualization.11 Similarly, 
there are other groups that advocate, under liberal 
foundations, that the right to life cannot be recognized 
whatsoever or, if recognized, it should not enjoy a protection 
                                                
	  
	  
8 For instance, that has been the case in Mexico, where some State 
constitutions have recently been amended so as to recognize a right to 
life from conception. See Contitución Política del Estado Libre y 
Soberano de Baja California [C.P.B.J.], as amended, art. 7, Periódico 
Oficial [DO], 21 de Marzo de 2014 (Mex.). 
9 See S.T.F. Petition No. 3510, Relator: Carlos Ayres Brito, 29.05.2008, 96, 
Diário Da Justiça [D.J.], 28.05.2010, 134 (Braz.) (on the constitutionality of 
the Biosecurity Act, where the Supreme Court recognizes no rights to 
embryos.). 
10 See, e.g., Jorge Contesse, Universally Speaking? The Cultural Challenge to 
Rights and Constitutionalism, 77 REVISTA JURÍDICIA U.P.R. 267 (2008).  
11 See, e.g., Ligia M. de Jesús, Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica: The Inter-
American Court on Human Rights’ Promotion of Non-existent Human Rights 
Obligations to Authorize Artificial Reproductive Technologies, 18 UCLA J. OF 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 275 (2014).  
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to the detriment of the enjoyment of rights of other affected 
individuals.12  
In 2012, as a way of deciding the fate of this debate in 
the context of Costa Rica, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) identified that the employment of 
these dialects had been governing this disagreement and 
claimed the need for change.13 The IACtHR, analyzing how 
to frame the discussion on when human life begins, 
maintained the following:  
Some of these opinions may be associated with 
concepts that confer metaphysical attributes on 
embryos. Such concepts cannot justify preference 
being given to a certain type of scientific literature 
when interpreting the scope of the right to life 
established in the Convention, because this would 
imply imposing specific types of beliefs on others 
who do not share them.14  
 
In its judgment, the IACtHR decided that a reasonable 
interpretation on when life begins must not impose one 
particular moral understanding of rights on everyone.15 On 
                                                
	  
	  
12 See, e.g., Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, Bernard M. Dickens, & Sandra 
Dughman-Manzur, Human Rights to In Vitro Fertilization, 123 INT’L J. OF 
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 86, 88 (2013); Bernard Dickens & Rebecca 
Cook, The Legal Status of Embryos, 111 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & 
OBSTETRICS 91 (2010).   
13 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 185 (Nov. 28, 2012) 
[hereinafter Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica]. For a detailed 
discussion of the case, see Martín Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, From 
Recognition to Regulation: Access to In Vitro Fertilization and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 25 FLA. J. OF INT’L L. 587 (2013). 
14 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, ¶ 185. 
15 Id. ¶ 191. 
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the contrary, it should reconstruct the metaphysical or 
ontological considerations about the controversy in a 
systematic way, on the basis of the legal system to which 
these conceptualizations belong.16 Furthermore, the IACtHR, 
also speaking from the language of rights, maintains that 
considerations of when human life begins, whichever dialect 
they are based on, should “keep abreast of the passage of 
time and current living conditions.”17 In the context of 
assisted reproductive techniques, the IACtHR requires that 
the narrative of reproductive health rights be spoken from 
the language of rights (regardless of the dialect employed), 
must not lose sight of the legal system to which they belong 
(both the internal and international legal order), and needs 
to address the current necessities and problems of 
individuals.18  
Intending to keep aloof of the theoretical reflections 
around the use (or abuse) of the language of rights, this 
article will draw on that language as a framework for 
studying the recent developments of the debates around the 
beginning of legal personhood and assisted reproductive 
techniques (ARTs) in Argentina. Recently, the National 
Congress of Argentina has approved the unification of the 
National Civil Code with the National Commerce Code, a 
legal reform that became operative in August of 2015.19 This 
important legal reform entailed several changes to the 
general principles of private law and family law. In fact, in 
the congressional (and media) debates around the drafting 
and approval of the reformed Code, the determination of 
                                                
	  
	  
16 Id.   
17 Id. ¶ 245.  
18 Id. ¶ 191. 
19 Law No. 26.994, Oct. 1, 2014, B.O. 32985 (Arg.). 
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when legal personhood begins, and what are its effects for 
the legal regime of ARTs have been among the issues that 
provoked heated disagreements.20 What has been the object 
of these debates around the beginning of legal personhood 
and ARTs in the new Argentinean Civil Code? Did 
Argentinean Representatives learn anything from the 
experience of past debates in the region on how to regulate 
the beginning of legal personhood and ART’s in a way that 
respects and protects human rights of individuals? This 
article will argue that the text of the new Civil and 
Commerce Code failed to accommodate discourses about 
when life begins under a reasonable lingua franca of human 
rights. In light of that, we will propose a reading of the text 
that is consistent with human rights case law.  
For the purposes of presenting this argument, the 
article will be organized as follows: Section II will first 
present how the former civil code used to structure the 
beginning of legal personhood, and the position adopted by 
the drafters of the reform. This presentation will allow a 
comparison of the courts’ understanding and conservative 
actors’ use of the language of rights for structuring “when 
life begins” in the Argentine legal tradition. Next, this 
Article will discuss an explanation on how such 
determination on the beginning of legal personhood framed 
                                                
	  
	  
20 Other major disagreements include whether or not the Code should 
rule on state responsibility – it doesn´t – and the legal status of contracts 
concluded in a currency other than Argentine pesos. See, e.g., Martín 
Hevia, Controversias del Nuevo Código Civil, CLARÍN (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.clarin.com/opinion/Codigo_Civil_y_Comercial-
responsabilidad_del_Estado-fertilizacion-
depositos_bancarios_0_1406859346.html; Martín Hevia, En Manos de la 
Corte, BASTIÓN DIGITAL (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://ar.bastiondigital.com/notas/en-manos-de-la-corte.  
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the exercise of reproductive rights through, for instance, 
assisted reproductive techniques. Lastly, this section will 
conclude by showing that before the approval of the new 
Civil and Commerce Code, there were two dialects of rights 
governing the debate on when life begins.  
Section III critically analyzes the outcome of such 
debates at the National Congress on the reform of the Civil 
Code. In this section, the article will discuss how the 
beginning of legal personhood is prescribed in the current 
Civil and Commerce Code and its effects on the legal regime 
of ARTs. Furthermore, Section III will show the perils 
entrenched in the language of the new articles, in that they 
grant judges broad discretionary power for determining the 
scope of each article’s mandate. In reaction to this, Section III 
will present the jurisprudence of the IACtHR as a binding 
doctrine for local judges when deciding the scope of 
individual enjoyment of reproductive rights.  
Section IV critiques the legislative decision to prescribe 
a legal concept in private law such as the “beginning of 
existence.”21 By contrast, this section proposes that any 
legislative decision to prescribe a legal concept of this nature 
within private law should specifically focus on when legal 
personhood has legal effects in private law, and not extend 
beyond this scope. In this case, the article will argue that 
legal personhood should refer to when born human beings 
become subjects of legal regulation and protection. Under 
this thesis, a Civil and Commerce Code governing private 
relations between individuals would not have to deal with 
the recognition of rights to embryos and pronucleate 
oocytes, or the evaluation of scientific data for determining 
                                                
	  
	  
21 CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CÓD. PROC. Civ. 
Y COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 19 (2012) (Arg.). 
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when legal personhood commences. Rather, the thesis 
maintained in Section IV would facilitate a better 
understanding of the role of the articles prescribed in the 
Civil and Commerce Code on the legal regime of ARTs in 
Argentina, as well as the fulfillment of human rights 
obligations assumed by the State to its individuals. 
Finally, Section V summarizes the findings of the 
article and presents a conclusion. 
 
II.   THE BEGINNING OF EXISTENCE: THE ROLE OF THIS 
CONCEPT IN THE ARGENTINEAN FORMER CIVIL CODE 
AND IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW CIVIL AND 
COMMERCE CODE 
 
The legal issue of when legal personhood begins for the 
purpose of private law (i.e. legal parenthood, assisted 
reproductive techniques, or emergency contraception) has 
been framed in Argentina’s former and current Civil Code as 
“the beginning of existence.” 22 This section attempts to 
disperse some of the haziness within the legal question of 
“the beginning of existence” and focus on how judicial 
interpretation of this issue in the former Civil Code initially 
affected access to assisted reproductive techniques. 
Furthermore, this section will draw attention to the core 
developments propelled by a Commission of Jurists 
regarding the “beginning of existence” in their draft to the 
reform of the Civil and Commerce Code, as well as some 
critiques to this draft expressed in the congressional debates 
of the reform.  
The analysis on “the beginning of existence” in 
Argentina’s Civil Codes will proceed in two parts. First, this 
                                                
	  
	  
22 Id.; CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 70 (1883) (Arg.).  
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section will focus on what the former Civil Code (from 1869) 
could have possibly imagined about assisted reproductive 
techniques, and what, in fact, the courts interpreted the Civil 
Code to say about embryos, rights, and assisted 
reproductive techniques. This section will draw attention to 
the fact that petitioners have framed their demands for the 
regulation of and restrictions on access to ARTs under a 
language of rights, but that are underpinned in a 
metaphysical or ontological dialect; the courts have 
conceded such demands. 
The second part will describe how an appointed 
Commission of Jurists for the drafting of a new Civil and 
Commerce Code harmonized assisted reproductive 
techniques with the legal issues embedded in “the beginning 
of existence” articles. Additionally, this second part will 
present some of the critiques associated with this draft of the 
new Civil and Commerce Code, which were expressed 
during its evaluation in the congressional debates. This 
second part will argue that, while some interesting 
developments guaranteeing access to assisted reproductive 
techniques were achieved, the framing of this issue in the 
Code still allows for interpretations that potentially threaten 
individual human reproductive rights. Lastly, this part will 
conclude by showing how the proposed regulation by the 
Commission of Jurists on when life begins was meant to 
reconstruct different dialects coming from the language of 
rights on the matter, and hence, serves as a way of 
accommodating these languages under a single narrative of 
reproductive rights in private law.  
 
A.   ACCESS TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNIQUES 
UNDER THE 1869 ARGENTINEAN CIVIL CODE 
Efforts for determining when existence begins in the 
Argentine legal order has been a recurring issue and practice 
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in Argentinean legal consciousness since 1869, when the 
National Congress approved the Civil Code drafted by 
Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield.23 In his initial comparative law 
undertaking, identifying and prescribing all possible legal 
issues in private law, the author decided to prescribe “the 
beginning of existence of persons before being born”:  
ARTICLE 70: The existence of personhood 
begins from the moment of conception in the 
maternal womb. These persons, before being 
born, may acquire certain rights as if they 
would have already been born. Such rights are 
irrevocably acquired if those conceived in the 
maternal womb were born with life, even if 
such livelihood lasted moments after being 
separated from the mother.24  
 
With relation to what is prescribed in this article, the 
former Civil Code also established, in Article 51, that every 
being that presents “human characteristics” shall be 
considered a “person.”25 Along this reasoning, the former 
Civil Code stated in Article 63 that unborn beings conceived 
                                                
	  
	  
23 Law No. 340, Sept. 25, 1869.  
24 CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.). 
25 CÓD. CIV. art. 51 (Arg.). In the footnote to Article 70, Vélez Sársfield, 
the codifier, says that, “in order to be considered a person, the child must 
be born ‘a human creature.’”  The codifier adds that “in order to be 
capable of [having] rights, the child must present externally recognizable 
characteristic signs of humanity; or must be, according to the Roman 
characterization, neither monstruous nor prodigious; but a mere 
deviation from the normal forms of humanity, for example an 
extraneous or deficient limb, does not inhibit the capacity to possess 
rights.” The text quoted by the codifier do not tell us by which signs to 
recognize a human creature. It seems that the “pate ought to resemble 
the [standard] human form.” Id. art. 70. 
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in a maternal womb shall be considered “unborn persons.”26 
The principle embedded in these articles states that unborn 
beings might acquire legal personhood and become rights-
bearers.27 Furthermore, the language of this article shows that 
Velez Sarsfield sought to recognize legal protections for 
unborn beings, regardless of the viability of the pregnancy.28  
In light of the advances of reproductive science and the 
access to ARTs, the language of these articles left a legal void, 
since there was no legal certainty as to whether the practice of 
these techniques contradicted the system of articles on the 
beginning of life. Notwithstanding, given that in vitro 
fertilization involves the generation of an embryo outside of 
the maternal womb, a literal interpretation would mean that 
such organism is not an unborn person, at least until it is 
inserted in the maternal womb. Contrary to this 
interpretation, case law from Argentina has interpreted 
embryos and pronucleate oocytes as “unborn humane 
persons” that have rights capable of trumping the exercise of 
individual’s reproductive rights to access ARTs.29   
The main example of this framing of the issue is R., R. 
D. s/ medidas precautorias, a 1999 National Appellate Chamber 
for Civil Matters case that shows an effort by the courts to 
                                                
	  
	  
26 Id. art. 63. 
27 Id. art. 70. 
28 For a discussion of the legal status of anencephalic pregnancies in 
Argentina, and an analysis of recent case law in several jurisdictions, see 
Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, Martín Hevia, & Bernard M. 
Dickens, Prenatal Management of Anencephaly, 102 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY 
& OBSTETRICS 304, 306 (2008). 
29 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, Sala I [CNCiv.] [National 
Court of Civil Appeals], 03/12/1999, “Rabinovich Ricardo David s/ 
medidas precautorias,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2000-III-630) 
(Arg.) [hereinafter Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv.]. 
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harmonize the legal issue of the beginning of the existence of 
personhood prescribed in the former Civil Code with ARTs 
treatments.30 The case considered the petition of Dr. 
Rabinovich, demanding legal protections for embryos and 
pronucleate oocytes that are the object of assisted 
reproductive techniques and treatments such as 
cryopreservation.31 In the Chamber´s reasoning, the former 
Civil Code and international human rights treaties, such as 
the American Convention on Human Rights, allow for the 
interpretation that embryos and pronucleate oocytes have 
human personhood.32  
The Court’s approach to the issue explains two 
important points. First, the Chamber bases its reasoning on 
international human rights law. This was made possible 
given that, under Article 75(22) of Argentina’s Constitution, 
certain international human rights treaties gain constitutional 
status, and consequently, human rights provisions within 
these treaties are considered recognized rights.33 In turn, 
Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
represents a legal tool that, under a certain interpretation, 
may yield the result that embryos are right-holding persons 
and, conversely, that their rights merit State protection. 
Article 4.1 states: “Every person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in 
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”34 As a consequence of 
embryos being recognized as “unborn persons” and holders 
                                                
	  
	  
30 Id. at 451. 
31 Id. at 412. 
32 Id. at 444. 
33 Art. 75(22), CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) [hereinafter 
CONST. NAC.]. 
34 American Convention art. 4(1). 
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of a right to life, the Court also recognized their right to 
physical and psychological integrity under Article 5(1) of the 
American Convention.35 This is possible given the language 
in which this right is framed, which states, “Every person has 
the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity 
respected.”36 Hence, as a matter of international human rights 
law, the court recognized that such organisms have a right to 
life and a right to physical and psychological integrity.  
A second, related point is that the Chamber’s reasoning 
appeals, to a great extent, to the lingua franca of rights agreed 
upon within the Inter-American legal system. The Chamber 
could have rested its decision entirely on the provisions from 
the former Civil Code and on the fact that, at the moment of 
its decision, there was no other federal statute addressing 
such a private law matter.37 However, as explained 
previously, the court delved into international human rights 
law and delivered its sentence speaking from a common 
language of rights, as accorded under Argentina’s 
Constitution. Furthermore, the court uses such language to 
introduce its ontological understandings on the matter of 
when life begins and whether to recognize rights of embryos 
or not. This is expressed, as the Chamber maintains, because 
embryos undoubtedly present a unique genetic code that 
serves as evidence of determinate individuality and 
biological potentiality of developing into a person.38 In this 
sense, the Courts use of the language of rights in justifying 
their decisions and reveal a specific dialect within the lingua 
franca of rights in the Inter-American System of Human 
                                                
	  
	  
35 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 416.  
36 American Convention art. 5(1). 
37  Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 414. 
38 Id. 
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Rights as they introduce a moral construction of the rights 
recognized.  
As a consequence of this reasoning, the Chamber 
ordered that the embryos and pronucleate oocytes that 
remain cryopreserved should not be used without the court’s 
permission.39 The court also prohibited the extermination or 
experimentation on these embryos and pronucleate oocytes.40 
Lastly, it also ordered a census of each individual 
cryopreserved embryo and assigned a children’s public 
defender to each for its protection.41  
The reasoning in this judgment, given the lack of 
specific national legal regulation on assisted reproduction 
techniques, became a source of reference among different 
judicial authorities considering similar controversies.42 
Interestingly, all of these cases show the influence from the 
R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case, in the sense that they all 
refer back to international human rights law as a base for 
arguing that a rights-holding person exists beginning from 
conception. Hence, tribunals have relied on the former Civil 
                                                
	  
	  
39 Id. at 451. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 451. 
42 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata [CFed. Mar 
del Plata] [Federal Court of Appeals of Mar del Plata], 29/12/2008, “L., 
H. A. et al. c. Instituto de Obra Médico Asistention & Others,” [S.J.A.] 
(2009-10-06-2009) (Arg.) [hereinafter L., H. A. et al. – CFed. Mar del 
Plata]; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal 
Court of Appeals of Salta], 03/09/2010, “R., N. F. et al. c. Obra Social del 
Poder Judicial de la Nación,” Abeledo Perrot (2010-07-37) (Arg.) 
[hereinafter R., N. F. et al. – CFed. Salta]; Cámara de Apelaciones en lo 
Contecioso Administrativo de Mar del Plata [CApel.CC Mar del Plata] 
[Administrative Claims Chamber of Appeals of Mar del Plata], 
24/02/2012, “S., G. et al. c. I. O. M. A.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] 
(2012-II-90) (Arg.) [hereinafter S., G. et al. – CApel.CC Mar del Plata]. 
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Code and international human rights law to argue that 
embryos or pronucleate oocytes have legal personhood from 
the moment of conception, either in or outside of the 
maternal womb.  
The R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case shows how the 
structuring of the legal regime for ARTs is sustained 
primarily on what is prescribed in the former Civil Code as 
the beginning of the existence of personhood. Particularly, 
these courts based their reasoning without properly 
considering that the former Civil Code provides no legal 
solution to conception occurring outside of the maternal 
womb for the purposes of establishing the moment of 
conception. On the contrary, this reasoning seems to stem 
from an in dubio pro life presumption, where the mere 
existence of human characteristics suffices for awarding such 
organisms with the protections of human rights.43  
This has been the legal tradition in Argentinean legal 
order. Courts would usually consider the former Civil Code 
to be the ultimate source of the law for deciding the fate of 
private law controversies.44 This practice was explained on 
the basis of the influences of the continental legal tradition 
and French legal formalism in the post-revolutionary 
period.45 With this context in mind, the principles and values 
embedded in the National Constitution were applied by 
courts primarily on controversies about the political 
organization of the State, but not for the reasoning of private 
                                                
	  
	  
43 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 416.  
44 E.g., Martín Böhmer, Democracia de Poderes a la Argentina: Democracia en 
las Formas, Monarquía en el Fondo, in EL PAÍS QUE QUEREMOS: PRINCIPIOS, 
ESTRATEGIA, Y AGENDA PARA ALCANZAR UNA ARGENTINA MEJOR (Sergio 
Berenztein et al. eds., 2006). 
45Id. (for a discussion on the influence of the French formalist tradition in 
Argentina). 
2016 THE LINGUA FRANCA OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 703 
 
law disputes.46 This context explains how the fate of certain 
practices, such as the access to ARTs, was decided on the 
basis of the contents of the former Civil Code and was not 
balanced by the human rights and State obligations 
prescribed in the National Constitution.  
On this last issue, for instance, the R., R. D. s/ medidas 
precautorias case did not consider the human rights of 
individuals seeking ARTs in the exercise of their reproductive 
rights, right to family, or right to privacy. Additionally, the 
court also failed to consider the autonomy principle 
embedded in Article 19 of the National Constitution, which 
states that the State shall not interfere with the private acts of 
individuals whenever these acts are not prohibited by law.47 
Regretfully, such omission in the reasoning of the case serves 
as example of how private law controversies, where 
adjudicated under the former Civil Code as the principal 
source of law, disregard some of the more hierarchical 
sources, such as the National Constitution or international 
human rights law case law and doctrine. 
The narrative of reproductive rights, as structured in 
Argentinean institutions (i.e. Civil Code, Private Law Courts), 
had been governed by a dialect of rights with an ontological 
basis.48 Under this language of rights, embryos were found to 
be “unborn human persons” with rights and, conversely, the 
State had an obligation to guarantee absolute protection of 
their rights.49 Such absolute protection of embryos’ right to 
life meant prohibiting the destruction, experimentation, or 
                                                
	  
	  
46 Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti, CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION 
COMENTADO: TOMO I 36-37 (Santa Fe: Rubinzal-Culzoni ed., 2014). 
47 Art. 19, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).  
48 CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y. COM. art. 19 (Arg.); CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.). 
49 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29. 
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cryopreservation of them, as well as limiting access to 
ARTs.50 The Court’s determination also meant limiting 
individual’s enjoyment of their right to form a family and 
their right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, but it 
also limited physicians’ or scientists’ right to work and their 
right of association.51 The ontological basis was also used to 
justify restrictions on access to emergency contraception.52 
However, in the context of the reform of the Civil and 
Commerce Codes, a different resisting dialect, also channeled 
through the language of rights, found an institutional setting 
with the purpose of accommodating individuals’ right to 
form a family and brought legal clarity to legal parenthood 
issues that were emerging as a consequence of ARTs.  
 
B.   THE BEGINNING OF EXISTENCE IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW 
CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE 
 In 2011, a Commission of Jurists, whose members were 
Justice Ricardo Lorenzetti (President of the Supreme Court of 
Justice), Justice Elena Highton de Nolasco (Vice-President of 
the Supreme Court of Justice), and former Justice Aída 
Kemelmajer de Carlucci, were entrusted by President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner with the work of reforming the Civil 
and Commerce Code of Argentina.53 In 2012, they delivered a 
                                                
	  
	  
50 Id. at 11-12. 
51 Id. at 11. 
52 See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National 
Supreme Court of Justice], 05/03/2002, “Portal de Belén Asociación Civil 
sin Fines de Lucro c. Ministerio de Salud de la Nación/ANMAT,” [J.A.] 
(2002-III-472) (Arg.) [hereinafter Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin 
Fines de Lucro – CSJN]. For a discussion of the case law on emergency 
contraception, see Hevia, supra note 1.  
53 Executive Decree No. 191/2011, Feb. 28, 2011, B.O. 32101 (Arg.).  
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draft for consideration by President Fernández, who then 
presented a (somewhat) amended version to the National 
Congress.54  
 The reasons expressed by the Commission of Jurists’ 
for introducing reforms to the former Civil Code included an 
express statement that private law matters should not be 
governed solely by what is prescribed in the Code, but also 
by human rights treaties that the State has adopted as part of 
the National Constitution.55 This governing principle, calling 
for the constitutionalization of private law, sought on the one 
hand, to harmonize the classic divide between public and 
private law and human rights, and on the other hand, to 
create a more binding obligation on judges for the application 
and enforcement of State human rights obligations in private 
law controversies.56   
 Regarding the governance of reproductive rights in the 
context of private law situations or relations, the Commission 
of Jurists decided that it was relevant for the new Civil and 
Commerce Code to “set” the beginning of human 
personhood.57 To that end, the draft of the Commission of 
Jurists established in Article 19, 
                                                
	  
	  
54 Modificaciones del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional al Anteproyecto de Reforma del 
Código Civil elaborado por la Comisión de Reformas, NUEVO CODIGO, 
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/7-
Fundamentos-de-los-cambios-introducidos-por-el-P.E.N..pdf (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2016). 
55 Art. 75, § 22, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).  
56 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, 
NUEVO CODIGO 4, http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/5-Fundamentos-del-Proyecto.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2016). 
57 Id.  
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ARTICLE 19. The existence of human 
personhood begins with the conception in the 
maternal womb. In the case of exercise of 
assisted reproductive techniques, it begins 
with the implantation of the embryo on the 
woman, notwithstanding that which a special 
Statute may prescribe for the protection of the 
non-implanted embryo.58  
 
Given this new opportunity to legislate when human 
personhood begins, the draft redacted by the Commission of 
Jurists chose to set a principle slightly similar to the one of 
Sarsfield’s Code. In general, for the purposes of private law, 
the existence of a human legal person begins at the moment 
of conception in the maternal womb. However, the 
Commission of Jurists was aware of the need to contemplate 
the practice of ARTs under Argentine private law. To that 
end, the proposed Article 19 established a distinction 
between ARTs and natural reproduction. For the latter, the 
beginning of legal personhood seemed to be at the moment of 
conception in the maternal womb; whereas for ARTs it was 
determined at the moment of implantation in the woman. Do 
conception and implantation refer to different moments for 
determining when legal personhood begins? What drives this 
distinction?   
The distinction prescribed in Article 19 of the draft of 
the Civil and Commerce Code could be interpreted as 
establishing two different moments where legal personhood 
                                                
	  
	  
58 PROYECTO CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [PROYECTO CÓD. 
CIV. Y COM.] [DRAFT CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE] art. 19 (2012) (Arg.), 
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyecto-
de-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
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begins. For natural reproduction purposes, legal personhood 
begins at the moment of conception in the maternal womb.59 
Alternatively, for ARTs purposes, the beginning of legal 
personhood occurs at the moment the embryo is implanted in 
the woman. This distinction suggests that law could be 
recognizing legal personhood and legal protections for life 
developed under natural processes of reproduction prior to 
the establishment of these rights for embryos in ARTs. This is 
because an embryo may be considered conceived because of 
the mere fact of being inside the maternal womb by 
implantation. Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice 
recognized this reading in a case where it declared the 
unconstitutionality of commercialization and distribution of 
emergency contraception.60 The Court established in this old 
jurisprudence that conception occurs at the moment of 
fertilization between ova and sperm.61 Thus, it would seem 
that conception for purposes of contraception and ARTs is 
understood to begin at different biological moments, which 
would render a distinction in their legal status for the Civil 
Code. In support of this reasoning, the draft of the Civil and 
Commerce Code further prescribes that non-implanted 
embryos may have a legal status that is yet to be determined 
by a special law;62 conversely, this reflects that the legal status 
of embryos conceived in the maternal womb is clear and is 
protected by law. 
In light of this, what drives this distinction? Is this 
proposed new regulation coming from a language of rights? 
                                                
	  
	  
59 Id.  
60 Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro – CSJN, supra note 52. 
61 Id. 
62 PROYECTO CÓD. CIV. Y COM. art. 19 (Arg.), 
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyecto-
de-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
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What is the Commission of Jurists trying to communicate 
about this distinct value of the development of life in natural 
reproduction and ARTs?  
It could be argued that the Commission of Jurists 
prescribed this distinction and cast doubt on the need to 
recognize legal status or legal protection for non-implanted 
embryos for the purpose of deterring judicial reasoning like 
that described in the R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case. 
Under this thesis, the distinction would respond to the need 
for not obstructing access to ARTs, including services as 
cryopreservation, without the legal uncertainty that anyone 
could later claim the right to life and physical integrity of 
embryos. Hence, unless the embryos formed have been 
implanted in the woman, individuals are free to form 
embryos and even cryopreserve them without the obligation 
to immediately use all of them.   
Alternatively, the motives of the draft by the 
Commission of Jurists explain that determining a special 
regulation for when human personhood begins in the case of 
ARTs responds to regulating the issue of legal parenthood.63 
In this sense, it is important to consider the case law spurred 
in private law that discusses the issue of paternity and even 
property rights for the disposition of embryos in ARTs.64  
In P., A. v. S., A. C., a separated couple entered into a 
judicial dispute over the right of the woman to implant 
embryos in her body without the consent of her ex-
                                                
	  
	  
63 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, 
NUEVO CODIGO 27, http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/textos-oficiales-
2/ (last visited Oct 15, 2015). 
64 For a discussion of property rights on embryos and other related 
issues, see generally Hevia & Herrera Vacaflor, supra note 13.   
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husband.65 They both contributed their gametes for the 
formation of embryos at a moment when they were still 
married, and entered into a contract with an ART Institute for 
the cryopreservation of the embryos.66 Under that contract, 
the married couple agreed that, in case they separated, 
judicial intervention would be employed if either of the 
parties refused to consent to the other’s use of the embryos.67  
The judges discussed the woman’s right to use the 
embryos without the consent of her former husband, as well 
as his right not to become a parent.68 In their judgment, the 
Appeals Chamber reasoned that the former husband’s denial 
of the contract and his “procreational will” given at the 
moment of the in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment ignores the 
nature of the embryos and contradicts the principle of 
estoppel in Argentinean private law.69 Furthermore, the 
Appeals Chamber maintained that the former husband’s 
defense that he no longer wanted to be a parent was 
implausible.70 The judges reasoned that the husband’s genetic 
parenthood was already established at the moment he agreed 
to the IVF treatment.71 Moreover, his agreement to such 
treatment also meant that he was aware of the consequences 
for the embryos, in the event that the couple separated.72 In 
conclusion, the former husband’s willingness to submit to the 
                                                
	  
	  
65 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, Sala J [CNCiv.] [National 
Court of Civil Appeals], 13/09/2011, “P., A. c. S., A. C.,” La Ley [L.L.] 
(2011-E-435) [hereinafter P., A. c. S., A. C. – L.L.]. 
66 Id. at 438. 
67 Id. at 437. 
68 Id. at 437-39. 
69 Id. at 438-39. 
70 Id. at 439. 
71 Id. at 438-39. 
72 Id. at 438. 
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IVF treatment and consequent agreement to the contractual 
provisions disabled him from exercising a future refusal, as 
well as from exercising his right not to become a legal 
parent.73  
With regard to the right of the woman to have the 
embryos implanted in her body, the judges authorized the 
procedure under what could be understood as the “right of 
the embryos to be born with life.”74 Under this reasoning, the 
Chamber had to first argue that cryopreserved embryos 
could be recognized as “unborn human persons” and then 
argue that these embryos are right-holders to life.  
The court justified the woman’s right to use the embryos 
by arguing that cryopreserved embryos are unborn human 
persons with rights, as recognized by the former Civil Code.75 
However the Chamber was aware that the former Code did 
not establish anything about conception occurring outside the 
maternal womb.76 In turn, the judges argued that it should be 
understood that conception can occur outside the maternal 
womb, since the codifier could not possibly know that science 
would achieve such a thing in the future.77 This is so, given 
that embryos are organisms that have human characteristics 
and have been conceived, although not in the maternal 
womb, as established in Article 70.78 The judges also argued 
                                                
	  
	  
73 See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1115 (2008) (on the distinctions between genetic parenthood and 
legal parenthood). 
74 Martín Hevia & Ezequiel Spector, El derecho a no formar una familia: a 
Propósito del Fallo “P., A. v. S., A. C. s/ medidas precautorias”, in REVISTA DE 
DERECHO DE FAMILIA Y DE LAS PERSONAS 230 (2011). 
75 See P., A. c. S., A. C. – L.L., supra note 65. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.). 
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that conception should be interpreted as fertilization, as the 
Supreme Court did in its judgment on the unconstitutionality 
of the manufacture, distribution, and commercialization of 
emergency contraceptive medicine.79  
Once it was established that the embryo is an unborn 
human person, the judges consequently rested their 
reasoning on the R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case rationale 
in order to conclude that embryos have a right to life and 
physical and psychological integrity.80 In other words, the 
judges in this case awarded the woman the right to implant 
the embryos and, hence, become a mother, on the basis of an 
apparent right of the embryos to be born with life.81  
In attending to the emergence of such case law, the 
Commission of Jurists deemed it necessary to provide legal 
prescriptions in their draft of the Civil and Commerce Code 
that addressed the issue of parenthood in ARTs. 82 To such 
end, the beginning of the existence of legal personhood in 
ARTs begins with implantation of the embryo in the maternal 
womb. Different reasons drive this new determination. To 
begin with, it could be interpreted that until implantation, 
there is no legal interest awarded to the embryo by the draft 
of the Civil and Commerce Code. Consequently, judges 
would not be able to follow the analyzed stream of case law 
that understands that there is legal parenthood by 
individuals who engage in IVF merely for the fertilization 
occurring in the formation of the embryo. Similarly, it would 
prevent arguments that award rights to the embryo prior to 
                                                
	  
	  
79 Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro – CSJN, supra note 52.  
80 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29.   
81 Hevia & Spector, supra note 74.  
82 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, 
supra note 63. 
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implantation, and hence, would not allow for the recognition 
of an embryo’s right to be born and force legal parenthood on 
an individual who does not want implantation to occur.  
In fact, other provisions in the draft of the Civil and 
Commerce Code also address possible contingencies between 
legal parenthood and the practice of ARTs.83 Article 560 
prescribes that health institutions providing ART services 
must obtain previous, free, and informed consent from 
individuals who seek the treatment, and that these 
institutions must renew this consent every time there is a use 
of the gametes or embryos.84 Additionally, it establishes that 
individuals who are undergoing ART treatments can revoke 
their consent as long as conception or implantation of the 
embryo in the woman has not occurred.85 As a result of these 
articles, the Commission of Jurists’ draft established that legal 
parenthood would not be determined genetically;86 that is, 
legal parenthood is determined independently of whose 
gametes were used for achieving reproduction. Instead, the 
Commission created the concept of “procreational will.”87 
Under this concept, legal parenthood is established on the 
basis of the individual’s intention to form a family, rather 
than the biological nexus with the newborn.88 This concept 
also seeks to stress the importance of the will of the 
individuals who wish to form a family, rather than their 
biological capacity to reproduce. In this sense, the 
                                                
	  
	  
83 See generally PROYECTO CÓD. CIV. Y COM. (Arg.), 
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyecto-
de-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
84 Id. art. 560. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. art. 561. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
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determination of legal parenthood without regard to 
biological connection respects the exercise of the right to form 
a family by same-sex couples recognizing their autonomy 
and participation in society without discrimination.  
Thus, the current development in Argentinean case law 
on legal parenthood and ARTs, and the legal developments 
prescribed in the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code, 
provide a reason as to why the draft included a distinction 
regarding the beginning of the existence of legal personhood 
in ARTs. More importantly, these legal developments 
showed the need for legal clarity and determination of the 
effects ARTs had on establishing legal parenthood. On a 
different note, what does this distinction about when legal 
personhood begins communicate to the Argentinean Legal 
System? It could be argued that under the governing 
principle of constitutionalization of private law, the Commission 
of Jurists aimed to nudge judges, policy-makers, and 
individuals to contemplate and act in conformity with the 
international human rights and constitutional rights 
provisions. Furthermore, it could be argued that under such 
governing principle, the Commission of Jurists sought to 
invite Argentineans to embrace a lingua franca of rights 
among each other at the moment of entering into relations 
that may trigger legal effects in private law. In this sense, the 
new regulation on when legal personhood begins and its 
focus on ARTs as drafted by the Commission of Jurists are 
channeled through a language of rights. The legal effects of 
what is prescribed in Article 19 discloses that individuals 
have a right to form a family and a right to benefit from the 
scientific progress, and it also concedes that there may be 
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rights claims about the non-implanted embryos.89 In contrast 
to what has been established in the case law analyzed 
previously, the Commission of Jurists proposed a new regime 
for ARTs out of a certain dialect of rights that understands 
absolute protection of an embryo unreasonably restricts 
individuals’ rights.90 Hence, the language of rights embedded 
in Article 19 accommodated different rights claims and 
discourses on how reproductive rights should be regulated.  
These legal developments addressed by the 
Commission of Jurists’ draft to the new Civil and Commerce 
Code were discussed in the National Congress.91 In this 
institutional setting, the dialect of rights advanced by the 
Commission of Jurists attracted critiques from conservative 
groups that also framed their observations using the 
language of rights, but in a dialect that relies on metaphysical 
bases.  
For instance, the Argentinean Episcopal Conference 
critiqued the decision of the Commission not to recognize 
legal value and personhood to the non-implanted embryo.92 
                                                
	  
	  
89 Eleonora Lamm, El Embrión in Vitro en el Proyecto de Reforma de Código 
Civil y Comercial, in DERECHO DE LAS FAMILIAS, INFANCIA, Y 
ADOLESCENCIA: UNA MIRADA CRÍTICA Y CONTEMPORANEA 413-416 
(Marisa Graham & Marisa Herrera, eds., 2014).  
90 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, 
supra note 63. 
91 Resolución de la H.C.D.N, Resolution of the Honorable Chamber of 
Representatives of the National Congress, 
http://ccycn.congreso.gob.ar/resolucion.html (on the command to 
discuss the draft of the Commission of Jurist of the Civil and Commerce 
Code for its approval).  
92 Conferencia Episcopal Argentina [Argentina’s Episcopal Conference], 
Reflexiones y Aportes sobre algunos temas vinculados a la Reforma del Código 
Civil, Comisión Bicameral para la Reforma, Actualización, y Unificación del 
Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, Ponencias Buenos Aires, 
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In the opinion of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference, life 
(and legal personhood) begins at the moment of conception;93 
this opinion highlights the fact that there is no ontological 
distinction between being conceived in the maternal womb or 
outside of the maternal womb. Hence, the location where the 
embryos are conceived does not alter their human condition 
because they each represent a determinate individuality.94 In 
regard to this, Lafferriere argues that the draft seems to 
recognize, to some extent, the scientific evidence that the 
individual human condition begins at the moment of fusion 
between gametes.95 However, in order to accommodate the 
needs of contemporary society (i.e. the practice of ARTs 
unregulated), the non-implanted embryo was not given legal 
status.96 Hence, Lafferriere maintains that the distinction 
proposed by the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code is 
knowingly arbitrary in its recognition of the human 
characteristics of the non-implanted embryo, and guided by 
the economic interests of the biotechnology industry.97  
As a consequence, Lafferriere and the Argentinean 
Episcopal Conference further argued that such arbitrariness 
could not withstand scrutiny in the face of Argentina’s 





Pensamiento_y_Aportes.pdf [hereinafter Argentina’s Episcopal 
Conference]. 
93 Id. at 5. 
94 Id.  
95 JORGE NICOLÁS LAFFERRIERE, PONENCIA DEL CENTRO DE BIOÉTICA, 
PERSONA Y FAMILIA 6 (2012), 
http://www.unav.edu/matrimonioyfamilia/observatorio/uploads/300
89_Centro-Bioetica_Ponencia-2012.pdf.  
96 Id. at 6-7. 
97 Id. at 6. 
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international human rights obligations.98 Through the lingua 
franca of human rights, the Episcopal Conference maintained 
that Argentina’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child supported the Episcopal Conference’s 
interpretation that non-implanted embryos should be legal 
persons.99  
Under Article 1, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child defines a child as a human being of less than eighteen 
years of age, unless internal law of a State Party recognizes 
adulthood before that age.100 Upon ratification of the treaty, 
Argentina exercised an interpretative declaration stating: 
“child means every human being from the moment of 
conception up to the age of eighteen.”101 Hence, the Episcopal 
Conference holds that the Argentinean declaration makes no 
distinction with regard to where conception occurs and 
confirms that the beginning of legal personhood under 
Argentinean internal law is at the moment of conception.102  
Consequently, the Episcopal Conference began drawing 
attention to the unjust discrimination embedded in the 
distinction prescribed in Article 19 of the draft of the Civil 
and Commerce Code. Notwithstanding the problems that this 
may have raised about affording legal personhood to the 
non-implanted embryo for family law and private law, the 
Episcopal Conference maintained that the best solution was 
not to ignore the embryo’s right to dignity and right to life, 
which is a part of their human condition.103 In conclusion, 
                                                
	  
	  
98 Id. at 8; Argentina’s Episcopal Conference, supra note 93, at 5-6. 
99 Id. at 5-6. 
100 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44.24, art. 1 (Nov. 20, 1989).  
101 Law No. 23849, Art. 2, Oct. 16, 1990, B.O. 269983 (Arg.).  
102 Argentina’s Episcopal Conference, supra note 93, at 5-6. 
103 Id. at 6. 
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conservative groups again advocated for the absolute 
protection of the embryo as constituting a human person 
with rights grounded in the language of rights.  
In light of these critiques surrounding Article 19, as well 
as others presented around the country, in 2013, the National 
Congress reformed the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code 
of the Commission of Jurists.104 Under the political will of the 
majority party in the National Congress, the text of Article 19 
was reformed using language that failed to keep up with the 
current practices of individuals regarding their reproductive 
rights.105  
Thus far, this section presented the debate for 
structuring a narrative for reproductive rights in Argentinean 
legal order. In this debate, this section described the 
participation of the former and the draft of the Civil and 
Commerce Code as interpreted by courts, jurists, and social 
movements. An analysis of the interaction of the different 
voices in this debate reveals the fact that opposing 
perspectives on the exercise of reproductive rights channel 
their arguments through the same lingua franca of human 
rights, with the peculiarity that these groups construct their 
language under different dialects. 
 On the one hand, using metaphysical or ontological 
arguments, courts and conservative groups advocated for the 
absolute protection of embryos, disregarding individual’s 
right to form a family or enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress. On the other hand, a Commission of Jurists, in view 
of the case law that was spurred on the basis of the former 
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Civil Code and international human rights law, understood 
that it was important to keep Argentinean legal order abreast 
of the current living conditions of individuals and provide 
legal solutions for contemporary problems. To such end, the 
use of embryos merited regulation in their draft of the Civil 
and Commerce Code in order to respect individuals’ legal 
parenthood claims, but the Commission also recognized that 
the Congress could later award legal protections to non-
implanted embryos. In this sense, under the principle of the 
constitutionalization of private law, the Commission of Jurists 
sought to accommodate competing interests that past case 
law had adjudicated without clear legal rules.  
The next section will critically analyze the outcome of 
this debate: the approval of Article 19 of the Civil and 
Commerce Code and its effects for the legal regime of ARTs. 
This analysis will shed light on the regressive legislative 
decision adopted by the National Congress and the 
challenges for structuring a narrative for reproductive rights 
that abides with international human rights law, as 
established in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica.106 
 
C.   ARGENTINA’S NEW CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE: 
ARTICLE 19 AND THE ENJOYMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS 
At the end of the congressional debates over the draft of 
the Civil and Commerce Code presented by the Commission 
of Jurists, the majority party introduced modifications. Some 
of these reforms were approved by other Congressional 
minority political parties, but other reforms responded to 
core political perspectives of the majority party. However, 
                                                
	  
	  
106 See Hevia & Herrera Vacaflor, supra note 13.  
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there had been consensus on the drafted text of Article 19. 
Surprisingly, at the last moment, the majority party included 
a change to Article 19. The change was surprising, even for 
representatives of the majority party.107 In fact, strangely, 
when the final draft of the Civil and Commerce Code was 
introduced for its approval in the Senate, senators from the 
opposing and majority party expressed the need to further 
reform Article 19, possibly during its discussion in the House  
of Representatives.108 Nevertheless, the House of 
Representatives left Article 19 unchanged.109  
                                                
	  
	  
107 According to media coverage, the change in the text was due to 
concessions made by the National Government to the Catholic Church. 
See Código Civil: con cambios que pidió la Iglesia, apuran la sanción, CLARÍN 
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.clarin.com/edicion-impresa/Codigo-Civil-
cambios-Iglesia-sancion_0_1220877916.html; Mariano De Vedia, La 
Reforma del Código Civil va a debate con el aval de la Iglesia, LA NACIÓN 
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1731221-la-reforma-del-
codigo-civil-va-a-debate-con-el-aval-de-la-iglesia.  
108 República Argentina Versión Taquigráfica (Provisional) Cámara De 
Senadores De La Nación, 19th Reunión, 9th Sesión especial 135, 139-140 
(Nov. 27-28, 2013) (Congressional Debate on the Reform, Actualization 
and Unification of Civil and Commerce Codes of the Nation) (Arg.). 
Miguel Angel Pichetto, the Leader of the Majority Party in the Senate 
(Frente para la Victoria) expressed, “The second theme I want to 
mention, and I do not want to bore you with numbers, is that the article 
19 does not satisfy me either. I have a secular belief; that is, the things 
that are of the State belong to the State and the things that are of God 
belong to God. . . . I hope that this [article 19] be corrected in the House 
of Representatives [at the time they decide the approval of the Civil and 
Commerce Code]” (author’s translation). With a similar critique, 
Gerardo Morales, the Leader of the First Minority Party in the Senate 
(Unión Cívica Radical) also claimed, “If there is not conceptual clarity in 
[this version of] article 19, then we are not contributing anything. The 
previous text of article 19 did give a conceptual clarity, as it stated that 
there is beginning of life in cases of assisted human reproduction when 
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Under these new modifications, the new text of Article 
19 prescribes, “ARTICLE 19. Beginning of Existence. The 
existence of human personhood begins at conception.”110 
Despite the political consequences raised by this final reform 
to Article 19, this change in the text also resulted in legal 
consequences for ARTs. The final version of Article 19, 
approved by the National Congress, reintroduced the legal 
uncertainty of whether embryos should be considered legal 
persons with protected rights.111 Furthermore, this final and 
approved version of Article 19 demonstrates that the debate 
at the National Congress was won by the metaphysical or 
ontological language of rights-based attributions for arguing 
when life begins. The regression in the explicit recognition of 
the normative term “implantation” and the distinction 
between biological and assisted reproduction along the 
debate (see Table 1) shows that the juridical logic of the 
Commission of Jurists was not fully regarded, nor were 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
the embryo is in the maternal womb. Then, [this final version of article 
19] fall short in this respect” (author’s translation). Id. 
109 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CÓD. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL 
AND COMMERCE CODE] art. 19 (2015) (Arg.). 
110 Id.  
111 RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI (DIR.), CODIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA 
NACION COMENTADO: TOMO I 89-91 (Rubinzal-Culzoni Ed., 1st Ed. 2014). 
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112 The translation of these articles is our own. 
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Under this new reality, defining the beginning of 
existence of legal personhood generally at the moment of 
conception failed to address the legal issues brought up in the 
case law on ARTs. In light of this legal uncertainty, what 
interpretation should be given to the term “conception”? 
What are the legal effects of this final reform on the legal 
regime of ARTs? Would the embryo be considered a legal 
person with rights? Which rights would embryos have: the 
right to life and the right to be born? If cryopreservation is 
found to affect the embryos’ right to be born, could women 
be forced to have all of their embryos implanted? This section 
will present a critique to the final text of Article 19 of the new 
Civil and Commerce Code, as approved by the National 
Congress, based on the fact that it ignores the legal 
developments set in international human rights law. 
The term conception should be interpreted following 
discourse based on a language of rights advocated by the 
different groups that participated in drafting the Civil and 
Commerce Code. One important reason for structuring this 
debate under the language of rights stems from the 
governing principle of this Civil Code: the constitutionalization 
of private law. Under this principle, private law matters 
involving the enjoyment of reproductive rights by 
individuals must be interpreted with attention to the human 
rights obligations adopted by Argentina in signing 
international human rights treaties.113   
 With this principle in mind, interpretations around the 
term conception should take into consideration, in particular, 
what the American Convention on Human Rights has 
prescribed on the subject. As has been analyzed throughout 
this article, Article 4(1) of the American Convention has been 
                                                
	  
	  
113 LORENZETTI, supra note 111, at 29-31. 
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used for arguing in favor of absolute protection of the 
embryo. In 2012, the IACtHR has issued the sentence in 
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, in which the scope of Article 4(1) 
was determined, especially the term conception, in the 
context of an absolute prohibition on access to in vitro 
fertilization dictated by Costa Rica’s Supreme Court.114 
 IACtHR’s determination of the scope of the term 
conception regarding when persons have a right to life is 
relevant for interpreting Article 19 of the Argentinean Civil 
and Commerce Code for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
Argentina’s Supreme Court has established that, when 
interpreting an international human rights obligation 
assumed by Argentina under the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the doctrine established by IACtHR 
jurisprudence is the most authoritative voice, and conversely, 
it should be applied and incorporated in courts’ reasoning.115 
In this sense, using the case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, the 
IACtHR has established that the judicial branch of State 
Parties of the American Convention must apply both the 
American Convention on Human Rights, as well as an 
authoritative interpretation of the rights therein, as set forth 
                                                
	  
	  
114 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13. 
115 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN][National Supreme 
Court of Justice], 13/07/2007, “Mazzeo, Julio Lilo y otros s/ rec. de 
casación e inconstitucionalidad,” Fallos (2007-330-3248) (Arg.). See also 
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN][National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 27/11/2012, “Rodríguez Pereyra, Jorge Luis y otra c. Ejercito 
Argentino s/ daños y perjuicios,” Fallos (2012-335-2333) (Arg.) (the 
Supreme Court, reinstating the doctrine established by the IACtHR, 
declared that Argentina’s Judiciary not only has an obligation to exercise 
a judicial review with basis on the National Constitution but also on the 
basis of the American Convention on Human Rights. Thus, courts in 
exercising their judicial review must apply and interpret international 
human rights treaties ratified by Argentina.). 
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by the IACtHR.116 Thus, whenever courts in Argentina must 
face interpreting the term conception in Article 19 of the Civil 
and Commerce Code, they must do so in accordance with the 
jurisprudence set by the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo v. Costa 
Rica.  
 Secondly, under the principle of constitutionalization of 
private law, any private law judicial controversy regarding 
access or practices in the context of ARTs and embryos under 
Article 19 of the approved Civil and Commerce Code should 
apply the doctrine established in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica 
as an authoritative legal material. In this sense, the expression 
of motives set by the drafters of the Civil and Commerce 
Code maintained that the regulation established for the 
protection of the human person (i.e. Article 19) is 
reconstructed with attention to Argentina’s international 
human rights obligations.117 Hence, whenever judges reason 
on what interpretation should be given to the term 
“conception” in order to determine if an embryo is a human 
person with rights protections, the court must consider what 
the IACtHR has declared on what “conception” means under 
the American Convention. 
On the basis of the analysis presented, what was the 
scope given to the term “conception” by the IACtHR? In 
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, the IACtHR established when 
life begins for the purposes of determining which entities are 
                                                
	  
	  
116 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 125-128 (Sept. 26, 2006) 
[hereinafter Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile].  
117 PROYECTO CÓD. CIV. Y COM. § Aspectos Valorativos [Valorative 
Aspects of the Project of Civil and Commercial Code] (Arg.), 
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/textos-oficiales-2/. 
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not entitled to a right to life under Article 4(1) and Article 
1(2), which states “person means every human being.”118  
In Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, the IACtHR discussed 
the Costa Rican Supreme Court sentence declaring the 
absolute prohibition of access to IVF under the argument that 
IVF practices violate the right to life and human dignity of 
embryos.119 Consequently, the IACtHR had to determine the 
following issues: (i) whether embryos were persons under the 
American Convention, and thus, were entitled to the 
protection under the right to life; and (ii) if the absolute 
protection was a proportionate limit on individual’s rights for 
the embryo’s right to life.120 
 With regards to the first issue, the IACtHR had to 
determine the legal status of the embryo in order to assess if 
the embryo should be considered a person and thus, entitled 
to a right to life. To such end, the IACtHR referenced Article 
4(1), which establishes the following: “Every person has the 
right to have his life respected. This right shall be respected 
by law and, in general, from the moment of conception . . . 
.”121 In light of this, the IACtHR interpreted Article 4(1) and 
assessed when life begins under the term “moment of 
conception” through four different interpretative 
hermeneutics: (1) interpretation in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the terms; (2) systematic and historical 
interpretation; (3) evolutive interpretation; and (4) the most 
favorable interpretation, the object and purpose of the 
treaty.122 
                                                
	  
	  
118 American Convention art. 1(2).  
119 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶ 2. 
120 Id. ¶¶ 171, 272. 
121 American Convention art. 4(1). 
122 See generally Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶¶ 174-
264. 
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1.    INTERPRETATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDINARY 
MEANING OF THE TERMS  
The IACtHR admitted that the term “conception” at 
the moment of the drafting of the American Convention 
could not have possibly contemplated practices such as IVF 
because these practices did not exist.123 Conversely, the 
current state of the art in scientific and juridical literature has 
found two major trains of thought for explaining the term 
“conception.” 124 One side of the literature maintains that it is 
the moment of fertilization, that is, the union or fertilization 
of the egg by the spermatozoid.125 The other side of the 
literature understands “conception” to be the moment when 
the fertilized egg is implanted in the uterus. 126 With attention 
to such disagreements, the IACtHR is aware that most 
accounts of when life beings, or considerations on whether 
embryos or pre-embryos constitute a human being, rest on 
conceptualizations that grant metaphysical or ontological 
attributes to embryos. Such accounts, the IACtHR 
understands, cannot prevail over other kinds of literature 
explaining whether embryos are human beings, because 
doing so would imply the imposition of certain beliefs on 
others who do not share them.127 
 In light of this, the IACtHR reasoned that even though 
the embryo represents a “different cell with the sufficient 
genetic information for the potential development of a 
human being,” such development could not happen 
                                                
	  
	  
123 Id. ¶ 180. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 174-264 
127 Id. ¶ 185. 
2016 THE LINGUA FRANCA OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 727 
 
independently of a uterus. 128 The scientific literature 
presented caused the IACtHR to determine that, without 
implantation in a uterus, an embryo cannot acquire the 
necessary nutrients for its development. 129 Hence, the 
IACtHR ascertains that conception should be interpreted at 
the moment of implantation, which is when the embryo can 
develop into a human being.130 In other words, the non-
implanted embryo would not constitute a subject protected 
by Article 4(1) of the American Convention.131 
                                                
	  
	  
128 Id. ¶¶ 186-187. 
129 Id. ¶ 186 
130 Id. ¶¶ 186-189.  
131 For a critique of this argument, see Eduardo Rivera López, Conception, 
Fertilization and the Onset of Human Personhood: A Note on the Case Artavia 
Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, 6 INTER-AM. & EUR. H. R. J. 54, 59 (2013). Rivera 
López agrees with not recognizing legal personhood for in vitro 
embryos, but argues that the discussion about the recognition of legal 
personhood is a normative argument; thus, it cannot be based solely on 
scientific information:  
[A]n argument of a juridical-normative kind cannot be 
supported (exclusively) by empirical premises. The 
Court suggests that the “current” scientific “schools of 
thought” support two possible conflicting 
interpretations. However, no such substantive 
disagreement can exist in biology. Biological science can 
only describe and explain the different stages of 
embryonic development. Nothing normative can be 
extracted from this alone without committing a 
naturalistic fallacy. Claiming that one of the current 
scientific schools identifies conception with 
implantation (or with fertilization) implies either 
mistakenly ascribing some normative content to science 
or mistakenly identifying a terminological issue with a 
real one. . . . what is truly relevant for the Court’s 
decision in the case is not whether conception occurs 
with fertilization or with implantation, but rather from 
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2.    SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 
 Once the IACtHR determined that conception should 
be interpreted as the moment when the embryo is implanted 
in a uterus, the Court analyzed whether the implanted 
embryo should be recognized with an absolute protection of 
the right to life, as the Supreme Court of Costa Rica had 
established. The Court understood that the interpretation of 
the protections under Article 4(1) should be analyzed with 
attention to the legal system to which it belongs.132 In this 
sense, a systematic interpretation of the meaning and scope of 
the right to life should take into account what international 
human rights have established on the matter.133 For such 
purposes, on the one hand, the IACtHR historically 
interpreted what the drafters of Article 4(1) of the American 
Convention intended to protect. On the other hand, the 
IACtHR also interpreted what other human rights systems 
(i.e. the Universal Human Rights System, the European 
Human Rights System, and the African Human Rights 
System) have contributed to the interpretations of the right to 
life in the context of reproductive rights. The Court’s findings 
showed, firstly, that despite the intention of some drafters to 
eliminate the provision of “from the moment of conception” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
which moment do we consider that a human being 
(from the biological point of view) deserves legal 
protection, in the sense of possessing a right to life, and 
if, at early stages of development, this right is strong 
enough to displace other rights enshrined in the 
Convention (such as the rights to privacy and equality, 
among others). 
Id. 
132 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶ 191. 
133 Id. 
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or “in general,” such efforts were fruitless.134 Secondly, 
throughout a review of the different existing international 
human rights systems, the IACtHR found that courts and 
human rights instruments have recognized neither an 
absolute protection nor an absolute right to life for 
embryos.135 Instead, courts have identified that embryos have 
potential development and, conversely, they have recognized 
legal protection in balance with the human rights protections 
recognized in such treaties to the pregnant woman or the 
individuals who seek to form a family.136 Thus, the IACtHR 
understands that embryos, either implanted or not, have no 
recognized absolute protection of a right to life.137  
 
3.   EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION 
 The IACtHR also considers that when interpreting the 
scope of the right to life in the context of IVF, one must 
comprehend that “human rights treaties are living 
instruments, whose interpretation must keep abreast . . . 
                                                
	  
	  
134 Id. ¶ 221; see also Christian B. White & Gary K. Potter v. Estados 
Unidos de América, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.23/81, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc.9 rev. 1 (1980-1981) (The expression “in 
general” was introduced into the original text—in which it had not been 
contemplated—at the IACtHR’s suggestion. The Commission reasoned 
that it was necessary to reconcile existing differences among various 
legal regimens regarding the legal protection of the nasciturus. However, 
it is clear that Article 4.1 of the Convention, far from being a rule that 
unequivocally entitles the nasciturus to the right to life, offers a far less 
categorical protection.). 
135 See generally Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶¶ 225-
243. 
136 See generally id. 
137 Id. ¶ 244. 
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current living conditions.”138 This evolutive interpretation 
entails a comparative law analysis on how other international 
human rights jurisdictions have dealt with similar questions 
and interpreted right to life provisions in the context of 
IVF.139 Similarly, it also demands a comparative law analysis 
on how countries have regulated IVF practices and what legal 
status has been recognized for the embryo.140  
 With regard to the interpretation of the scope of the 
right to life under IVF practices in other human rights 
systems, the IACtHR analyzed several cases brought to the 
European Court of Human Rights claiming the protection for 
the embryos’ right to life and human dignity.141 In this 
analysis, the IACtHR concluded that, in the European 
Human Rights System, embryos were recognized with a 
potential to develop into persons, but that such status did not 
amount to recognition of a right to life or a “right to life of the 
unborn child.”142 Similarly, for the purposes of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, non-implanted embryos 
cannot be recognized as entitled to a right to life.  
In relation to how IVF has been regulated and the legal 
status awarded to the embryo in the Inter-American System 
of Human Rights, the IACtHR concluded that, at the moment 
of sentencing, most State Parties did not have specific 
regulation on the matter.143 Notwithstanding this, Chile, 
Brazil, and Perú had specific regulations stating that IVF 
practice needed to be exercised solely with the intention to 
                                                
	  
	  
138 Id. ¶ 245. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally id. ¶¶ 247-253. 
142 Id. ¶ 252. 
143 Id. ¶ 256. 
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procreate.144 Brazil, in particular, has regulations establishing 
that in order to protect the right to health of the individual 
from supernumerary pregnancy, a maximum of four 
embryos can be implanted in a uterus.145 Hence, the IACtHR 
concluded that, since the IVF is permitted in all countries of 
the Inter-American System except Costa Rica, IVF is 
compatible with what is established in Article 4(1).146   
 
4.    THE MOST FAVORABLE INTERPRETATION AND THE OBJECT 
AND PURPOSE OF THE TREATY 
 Lastly, the IACtHR conducts a teleological 
interpretation of Article 4(1) of the American Convention.147 
Along its reasoning, the Court has found that there is an 
obligation to protect a right to life, but the term “in general” 
alludes to the possibility that in the event of a conflict 
between rights, such protection should not be interpreted as 
absolute.148 Contrary to what the Supreme Court of Costa 
Rica has decided, an absolute protection of the right to life 
cannot be possible under a most favorable interpretation 
since it may lead to disproportionate limits on the human 
rights of other affected individuals. Consequently, given that 
the object and purpose of the American Convention is the 
protection of every person’s human rights, the “broadest 
protection” in favor of an absolute protection of the right to 
life is contrary to the object of the Convention. Conversely, 
the IACtHR has analyzed comparative constitutional case 
law from State Parties to the Convention where a balancing 
                                                
	  
	  
144 Id. ¶ 255. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. ¶ 256. 
147 Id. ¶ 257. 
148 Id. ¶ 258. 
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between human rights in conflict was exercised.149 The 
IACtHR concluded that the term “in general” in Article 4(1) 
alludes to the requirement to practice a balancing reasoning 
whenever there is a conflict between competing rights, that is, 
the right to life of an embryo or unborn life and the human 
rights of a woman.150 
 In conclusion, the Court’s doctrine in Artavia Murillo v. 
Costa Rica determines that the non-implanted embryo is not a 
subject of law protected under the right to life in Article 4(1) 
and that any rights protection argument raised in defense of 
embryos cannot be categorical, but rather must be balanced 
with the affected rights of the woman or affected 
individuals.151 Thus, Argentinean courts should adopt this 
doctrine of the term “conception” when interpreting ARTs 
practices and its consequences on the protection of the 
human person as prescribed in the new Civil and Commerce 
Code. With this conclusion in mind, decisions such as P., A. v. 
S., A. C. or R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias would be contrary 
to the doctrine set by the IACtHR and Argentinean legal 
order. Consequently, no protection of the law to the non-
implanted embryo could limit the right of individuals to form 
a family, or to enforce legal parenthood on the individual 
who refuses implantation of the embryo.   
 
III.   AN ARTAVIA MURILLO V. COSTA RICA READING OF 
ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE 
 
 As has been discussed above, Article 19 expresses that 
the existence of the human person begins at the moment of 
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conception. The term “conception” has also been analyzed 
under the interpretation of the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo v. 
Costa Rica. In this sense, this section has so far argued that 
under international human rights obligations, Argentinean 
courts should follow the case law established by the IACtHR. 
Notwithstanding this, how does the IACtHR’s finding in 
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica represent a different dialect of 
rights from the other dialects dismissed as being based on 
metaphysical or ontological understandings? Furthermore, 
how can the IACtHR interpretation of the meaning and scope 
of the right to life help harmonize Article 19 with the other 
regulations on the protection of the human person, as 
prescribed in the Civil and Commerce Code? Lastly, could 
the reasoning of the IACtHR be interpreted as a critique that 
spurs the need to draft when life begins into the Civil and 
Commerce Code? Could the reasoning of the IACtHR give a 
hint to the Argentinean legal tradition that what the law 
should focus on is legal personhood and its effects on third 
parties?  
 The IACtHR represents the most authoritative legal 
institution in charge of defining the meaning and scope of the 
lingua franca of human rights, accepted by most American 
States, and instrumented through the American Convention 
on Human Rights.152 As identified by the Court, the debate 
on when life begins involves a great deal and many different 
kinds of literature.153 In assessing this literature, the IACtHR 
seems to conclude that scientific or legal literature 
conceptualizing metaphysical or ontological attributes to 
early stages of life development fails to give equal respect 
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and consideration to all other affected persons on the debate 
of when life begins. In this sense, such literature should not 
be considered a proper source for explaining when life begins 
because it would entail the imposition of certain beliefs and 
understandings of the world onto others who do not share 
them.  
But this is not the sole reason. The debate about when 
life begins and its effects on the individual rights of others 
does not occur in isolation. Rather, the Court points out, such 
debate happens in a larger context, which is the developing 
narrative of reproductive rights of individuals.154 To such 
end, the Court has recognized that in determining the extent 
of the right to life of embryos, the scope left for the enjoyment 
of other recognized rights, such as the right to form a family 
or not to become a legal parent, should also be given equal 
consideration.155  
 For these reasons, a dialect of rights that gives equal 
consideration and respect to all individuals that integrate the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights must be aware of (i) 
what other systems have said about when life begins and 
how pre-natal life should be protected; (ii) how other systems 
and countries have interpreted the right to life with regards 
to ARTs in order to keep abreast of current lifestyles; and (iii) 
how these systems and countries have balanced right to life 
arguments for the protection of pre-natal life and other rights 
in conflict. Hence, the dialect of rights used by the Court to 
sustain the conclusion that the embryo should not be 
considered a person with the protection of the right to life 
reasonably accommodates, to some extent, the competing 
interests in this debate. The rights of individuals to form a 
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family, have access to IVF, or enjoy their right not to form a 
family is reasonably protected, but also, as of the moment of 
implantation, the Court recognizes that there may be legal 
protections awarded to that prenatal life, provided that the 
scope of such protection is balanced with the conflicting 
rights of individuals.  
 This dialect chosen by the IACtHR for sustaining its 
decision in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica may also be applied in 
Argentina’s internal law for harmonizing the lack of legal 
clarity embedded in the approved Article 19. In this sense, a 
systematic interpretation of the regulation on the human 
persons in the new Civil and Commerce Code demands that 
the term “conception” be harmonized with Article 20. Under 
this article, the Civil and Commerce Code determined the 
period of conception, which runs between the maximum and 
minimum periods of time set during a pregnancy.156 
Furthermore, Article 21 of the Code establishes that the rights 
and obligations of the “conceived” will be irrevocably 
acquired, only if born with life.157 An interpretation of the 
meaning of these articles means that there are potential rights 
and obligations claims afforded to prenatal life during 
pregnancy, but these rights and obligations become operative 
only provided that successful birth occurs. Moreover, Article 
20 specifically states that there cannot be conception without 
pregnancy.158 Under this reading, conception must be 
interpreted as the moment of implantation, since it is at this 
moment when it is considered that pregnancy is achieved.159 
This point clarifies that conception can exclusively occur in 
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the uterus of an individual and, conversely, a non-implanted 
embryo cannot be considered conceived.160  
 In addition to this, it is also important to pay attention 
to other relevant regulations that are operative in Argentina. 
Legislation enacted during 2013 prescribed regulations for 
establishing a legal regime of ARTs in the country.161 Statute 
No. 26.826, which prescribed integral access to assisted 
reproductive techniques in Argentina, determined that 
individuals who seek IVF treatments might revoke their 
consent prior to the implantation of the embryo.162 This 
statute also allows and commits the State to provide 
cryopreservation of gametes and embryos to individuals who 
seek ARTs at that moment or in the future.163 In light of this 
new legal framework for ARTs, the non-implanted embryo 
was recognized as having no legal value and, furthermore, 
cryopreservation or donation of gametes for IVF purposes 
were recognized as lawful practices.164  
Finally, the legislative decision to enact a Civil and 
Commerce Code that determines when life begins could be 
further critiqued. In this sense, the IACtHR has accepted that 
there is no definitive formula for determining when this 
occurs.165 A Civil and Commerce Code should not prescribe 
concepts such as “person” or “conception” on a biological, 
metaphysical, or ontological understanding; on the contrary, 
such concepts are normative concepts and, thus, should be 
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defined in juridical terms.166 Thus, a Civil Code should define 
when the Argentine legal system recognizes the legal status 
of personhood to a being in order to determine rights and 
obligations. In fact, a comparative private law analysis in the 
Inter-American region shows that countries such as Colombia 
or Brazil recognize that legal personhood begins at the 
moment of birth with life, where rights and obligations are 
acquired.167 In this sense, the Civil and Commerce Code of 
Argentina could have dispensed the need to regulate when 
life begins, and instead determined when legal personhood 
begins as it has done in the current Article 21. Recognition of 
legal personhood under these terms gives better legal clarity 
to the private law legal order and avoids litigation claiming 
the respect of Argentina’s international human rights 
obligations.  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
The new Civil and Commerce Code of Argentina has 
managed to contemplate solutions or default rules for most 
past and current contingencies that may arise in private law 
relations in Argentina. Most importantly, the new Civil and 
Commerce Code of Argentina includes Argentina’s 
international human rights obligations as commitments that 
shall also be respected by individuals when entering into 
private law relations with one another. With this overarching 
principle in mind, no doubt, the inclusion and regulation of 
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ARTs in the Civil and Commerce Code of Argentina is a step 
forward in the fulfillment of individual human rights. 
Notwithstanding, this article studies how the new 
private law governing legislation gestated and emerged in 
the context of reproductive rights, particularly, the regulation 
of ARTs. To this end, the article analyzed three moments in 
time. As a preliminary step, it studied what informed the 
drafters’ proposed regulation on ARTs. Such a study 
involved identifying how the former Civil Code and the 
jurisprudence structured the legal regime for access to and 
practice of ARTs. Correspondingly, the article showed how 
the draft of the new Civil and Commerce Code sketched by 
the Commission of Jurists decided to propose a regulation in 
response to past judicial interpretation that severely limited 
access to ARTs. Lastly, this article shed light on the 
consequences set out in the end result. Namely, this article 
revealed that the current Civil and Commerce Code, to a 
great extent, did not incorporate proposed regulations 
drafted by the Commission of Jurists, and consequently left 
the legal regime of ARTs under-regulated, with several legal 
uncertainties, and with referrals for special legislation that 
could severely restrict the universe of possible ART 
treatments.  
Throughout this analysis in time, this article disclosed 
that during the formative process of the current Civil and 
Commerce Code, different framings of “when human 
personhood existence begins” were advocated, but all of 
these were grounded in a language of rights. As was affirmed 
throughout this article, the legislative decision to determine 
when life begins brought about the discussion of at which 
moments an organism can be awarded the legal status of 
human personhood entitled to a right to life and the 
protection of the law. Hence, the article has shown that some 
groups that advocated for framings on this issue considered 
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the embryo in all its developmental stages as a full human 
person entitled to rights, while other groups did not consider 
it to be a person at all. Most importantly, this debate in the 
context of the Civil and Commerce Code reform was 
sustained in the lingua franca of human rights, agreed in the 
Inter-American Human Rights System, namely, the American 
Convention on Human Rights. In response to this fact, this 
piece has argued that a proper framing of such legal status 
must not entail moral or ontological foundations that would 
render the imposition of a belief or life plan on others. 
Moreover, at the moment of framing such legal status, a 
discourse for a certain framing based on the language of 
rights must take into consideration the legal system in its 
entirety and be able to keep abreast with current living 
practices of individuals. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ decision in 
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica proves to be a legal solution 
moving in the direction of solving the framing challenges 
observed in the drafting of the Civil and Commerce Code. 
Furthermore, and considering the legal uncertainties 
embedded in the current Civil and Commerce Code with 
regards to the legal regime of ARTs, this article has shown 
that courts must interpret the text of the Code following the 
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica precedent. In fact, many predict 
that this will occur because national courts have begun to 
increase compliance with international human rights 
regimes.168 However, as we suggested, this will necessarily be 
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the case because the debates surrounding the beginning of 
human legal personhood in Argentina are a reflection of the 
fact that the lingua franca of the American Convention on 
Human Rights has been invoked to defend both views. 
With this challenge ahead, judges and lawyers, among 
other equally important actors, may play, and have so far 
played, an important role in continuing this debate. Thus, in 
turn, this article calls for human rights lawyers and 
reproductive rights advocates to take on the role of 
reminding courts about the principles and values developed 
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